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100			_aEttinger, David
245		2	_aA Theory of Deception
300			_app.1-20
520			_a"This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent's strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the fundamental attribution error. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm."
562			_e0
650			_aCONOCIMIENTO Y PODER
650			_aNEGOCIACIONES
773			_0122685 _aAmerican Economic Journal Macroeconomics - Vol.2 No.1
942			_cSART
999			_c122686 _d122686